1
0
mirror of https://github.com/leethomason/tinyxml2.git synced 2026-07-21 19:23:00 +04:00

Fixes from security review (#1067)

Security fix
This commit is contained in:
Lee Thomason
2026-05-23 16:36:17 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 63428c8852
commit a737ecb2cb
2 changed files with 62 additions and 9 deletions
+12 -9
View File
@@ -552,12 +552,15 @@ const char* XMLUtil::GetCharacterRef(const char* p, char* value, int* length)
TIXMLASSERT(digit < radix);
const unsigned int digitScaled = mult * digit;
// Reject before adding: if digitScaled alone exceeds MAX_CODE_POINT,
// or if adding it to ucs would exceed it (checked without overflow by
// testing ucs > MAX_CODE_POINT - digitScaled, safe since digitScaled
// <= MAX_CODE_POINT at this point).
if (digitScaled > MAX_CODE_POINT || ucs > MAX_CODE_POINT - digitScaled) {
return 0;
}
ucs += digitScaled;
mult *= radix;
// Security check: could a value exist that is out of range?
// Easily; limit to the MAX_CODE_POINT, which also allows for a
// bunch of leading zeroes.
mult *= radix;
if (mult > MAX_CODE_POINT) {
mult = MAX_CODE_POINT;
}
@@ -569,11 +572,11 @@ const char* XMLUtil::GetCharacterRef(const char* p, char* value, int* length)
}
// convert the UCS to UTF-8
ConvertUTF32ToUTF8(ucs, value, length);
if (length == 0) {
// If length is 0, there was an error. (Security? Bad input?)
if (*length == 0) {
// If *length is 0, ConvertUTF32ToUTF8 rejected the code point.
// Fail safely.
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
return p + delta + 1;
}
return p + 1;
+50
View File
@@ -2701,6 +2701,56 @@ int main( int argc, const char ** argv )
XMLTest("Test attribute encode with a Hex value", value5, "!"); // hex value in unicode value
}
// ---------- Security: numeric character reference bounds ----------
{
// Regression: U+10FFFF is the last valid Unicode code point and must
// parse correctly. The in-loop overflow guard must not reject it.
XMLDocument doc;
doc.Parse( "<t v='&#x10FFFF;'/>" );
XMLTest( "Numeric ref U+10FFFF: no error", false, doc.Error() );
const char* v = doc.FirstChildElement()->Attribute( "v" );
// U+10FFFF encodes to the 4-byte UTF-8 sequence F4 8F BF BF.
const char expected[] = {
static_cast<char>(0xF4), static_cast<char>(0x8F),
static_cast<char>(0xBF), static_cast<char>(0xBF), 0
};
XMLTest( "Numeric ref U+10FFFF: correct UTF-8 output", expected, v );
}
{
// Boundary check: U+110000 is one above the maximum code point.
// The in-loop overflow guard must catch this before ucs is written,
// leaving the entity as a literal (starting with '&').
XMLDocument doc;
doc.Parse( "<t v='&#x110000;'/>" );
XMLTest( "Numeric ref U+110000: no parse error", false, doc.Error() );
const char* v = doc.FirstChildElement()->Attribute( "v" );
XMLTest( "Numeric ref U+110000: not resolved (left as literal)", true,
v != nullptr && v[0] == '&' );
}
{
// A hex entity with enough digits to overflow uint32_t must
// be rejected by the in-loop guard before the accumulator wraps.
// Before the fix, ucs could wrap around and pass the post-loop range
// check, producing an attacker-chosen character in the parsed output.
// Build "&#x" + 300 'F' digits + ";" -- far beyond what fits in uint32_t.
const char prefix[] = "<t v='&#x";
const char suffix[] = ";'/>";
static const int NDIGITS = 300;
char xml[sizeof(prefix) + NDIGITS + sizeof(suffix)];
strcpy( xml, prefix );
memset( xml + strlen(prefix), 'F', NDIGITS );
strcpy( xml + strlen(prefix) + NDIGITS, suffix );
XMLDocument doc;
doc.Parse( xml );
XMLTest( "Overflow hex entity: no parse error", false, doc.Error() );
const char* v = doc.FirstChildElement()->Attribute( "v" );
// GetCharacterRef returns 0 for rejected refs; the caller then copies
// the literal '&', so the attribute must start with '&', not a char.
XMLTest( "Overflow hex entity: not resolved to a character", true,
v != nullptr && v[0] == '&' );
}
// ---------- XMLPrinter Apos Escaping ------
{
const char* testText = "text containing a ' character";